They have their doubts, but it’s quite possible that two
(hitherto) unknown consultants are the ones responsible for the fact that Nir
Barkat is Jerusalem’s newly-elected mayor, rather than Moshe Leon.
For the last three months, Avreyme Kroizer and Ya’akov Izak
have conducted an exhausting roller-coaster chess game with a wily and more
experienced duo, MKs Arieh Deri and Avigdor Lieberman, who were backing Leon.
When the four arose from the table on the night between Tuesday and Wednesday
after polling stations had closed, the opponent’s king sat down to write a concessionary
speech.
Did the consultants do this while betraying the sector they
came from? Did they close an early deal or even give a political bribe, such as
a promise to Chaim Epstein, a one-man new Lithuanian faction on the City
Council, that he would receive the post of deputy mayor?
“We promised nothing. All related reports are lies and
fabrications”, said Izak. “No goodies were promised. We explained one thing to
the ultra-Orthodox community and that was sufficient – we told them that
supporting Moshe Leon was dangerous for their community.”
Both Kroizer and Izak were born 35 years ago to prominent
ultra-Orthodox families. They have been circulating for years in the power
centers of their community. Izak is, among other things, a spokesman for MK Ya’akov
Litzman, while Kroizer is an experienced consultant who has close ties with MK
Arieh Deri. Both of them have been external consultants to mayor Barkat for
five years.
“We’re not lobbyists”, says Kroizer. “We weren’t hired to
tell him when to wear a kippah and what the customs are when paying condolence
visits. It’s not the cosmetics, it’s the core issue that’s important. He heads
the most complex city in the world, with Jews and Arabs, with more churches
than in Rome, some just outside the ultra-Orthodox enclave. He understands that
he also has to serve this community. He wants to know what this community needs
and what the priorities are.”
These two played a key role in the election, which was held
within and around the ultra-Orthodox community. The pair managed to unravel the
legendary ultra-Orthodox bloc, with close to 100,000 voters. Moshe Leon’s
candidacy was based on this bloc. By all estimates all he needed was 30,000
non-Orthodox votes and victory would have been his.
Their achievement was based on a sophisticated exploitation
of the web of fissures, alliances and small nuanced differences that exist
among the ultra-Orthodox communities across Israel. In retrospect, what served
them best was the mistakes made by their opponent, mainly in view of the schism
in the Lithuanian orthodox community, which is growing ever-larger.
The two noticed a growing eagerness within the Jerusalem
faction of the Lithuanian community to separate from the Degel Hatorah party
and form their own new one (called Bnei Torah.) They contacted this faction and
took advantage of mistakes made by Leon. In the last days before the election,
they managed to recruit most of the Hassidic groups in Jerusalem. Ultimately,
it is estimated that they took at least 15,000 votes away from Leon, mostly
votes for the bloc's candidate, Haim Epstein, or blank ballots. Barkat received
around 3,000 votes in this community. Barkat won the elections by a margin of
15,697 votes.
Leon's first and most critical mistake was during the High
Holidays, according to the two consultants. Until then, Leon’s strategy had
been to first recruit secular voters and only then go after the ultra-Orthodox.
Kroizer says that “most of the Orthodox functionaries told Lieberman not to
rely on them, even though they were the majority of his supporters at that
time.
They told him to get 30,000 secular voters first. Leon was instructed to express himself in secular terms, with the Orthodox apparently already on board. However, he was blocked by a successful Barkat campaign, using antagonism to Lieberman and Deri, accusations of political trickery and Leon’s non-Jerusalem residence as a way of appealing to secular voters. Leon therefore turned back to the Orthodox community.” During the week of Sukkot, Leon’s people suggested that he first try to recruit the Orthodox community. They hoped that secular voters would join later if they sensed that he was going to win with the help of Orthodox voters.
They told him to get 30,000 secular voters first. Leon was instructed to express himself in secular terms, with the Orthodox apparently already on board. However, he was blocked by a successful Barkat campaign, using antagonism to Lieberman and Deri, accusations of political trickery and Leon’s non-Jerusalem residence as a way of appealing to secular voters. Leon therefore turned back to the Orthodox community.” During the week of Sukkot, Leon’s people suggested that he first try to recruit the Orthodox community. They hoped that secular voters would join later if they sensed that he was going to win with the help of Orthodox voters.
In order to make progress, Leon organized a photo op with
Rabbi Shteinman, the most prominent Lithuanian rabbi, in order to prove how
strong he was in that community. What he didn’t take into account was that he
was stepping right into the middle of a conflict that was splitting the
Lithuanian orthodox world. He may have gained Shteinman and Degel Hatorah with
that move, but he alienated another prominent leader, Rabbi Orbach, who may
have pushed Epstein forward just to damage Leon’s campaign.
According to the two advisers, Leon agreed to two of
Shteinman’s demands – to appoint one of his people as an adviser on Orthodox
affairs and to boycott Rabbi Orbach’s faction, in the event that it got to City
Council. This split the ultra-Orthodox bloc.
”They were disconnected and delusional. They thought that Orbach would stay with Shteinman and not put his own candidate forward”, says Izak. “Leon mistakenly thought that the ultra-Orthodox camp was one united bloc, a flock of sheep. It was no longer the case that a phone call from Lieberman could close a deal with Litzman, based on a promise of support from Deri. Only during the second month did they understand that this sector was split. Any other candidate would have realized that within a week.
”They were disconnected and delusional. They thought that Orbach would stay with Shteinman and not put his own candidate forward”, says Izak. “Leon mistakenly thought that the ultra-Orthodox camp was one united bloc, a flock of sheep. It was no longer the case that a phone call from Lieberman could close a deal with Litzman, based on a promise of support from Deri. Only during the second month did they understand that this sector was split. Any other candidate would have realized that within a week.
For the final two months, both sides focused on two targets,
the Hassidic and the Lithuanian communities. With the Lithuanians, Kroizer and
Izak tried to keep Epstein in the race, while Lieberman was trying to steamroll
him into quitting. With the Hassidic community they tried to keep the rabbis on
the fence, rather than joining Leon’s side.
They were so successful that two weeks before the elections,
the Council of Sages, made up of the leading Hassidic rabbis, decided not to
support Leon and that each rabbi would decide on his own. The battle now moved
to individual Hassidic camps – belonging to the Gur, the Belz, the Tzans and
the Slonim rabbis. Kroizer says that Leon’s people tried to reverse the
council’s decision.
They tried telling each rabbi that if he gave his support the others would follow suit. One tried telling a rabbi that if he gave him his signature for safekeeping he would only add it after the other rabbis signed their support. The rabbi answered that he would only give it when the others were available. Kroizer and Izak’s task was to prevent such conniving, keeping the elections clean.
They tried telling each rabbi that if he gave his support the others would follow suit. One tried telling a rabbi that if he gave him his signature for safekeeping he would only add it after the other rabbis signed their support. The rabbi answered that he would only give it when the others were available. Kroizer and Izak’s task was to prevent such conniving, keeping the elections clean.
Their main weapon was the surveys that showed that it would
be difficult to beat Barkat. The rabbis really dislike joining the losing side.
They cared about the odds. They were in Barkat’s coalition for five years and
were partners in his plans.
Others thought that Lieberman should prove himself, perhaps
by canceling one of the recent decrees such as the drafting of yeshiva
students. “If it’s important to you, show some loyalty,” they told him, but
Lieberman said he was unable to do that. His pressure peaked last week. “We
knew that when he came to Rabbi Orbach, the steam roller was beyond our
control. They talked of the draft law in exchange for supporting Leon. That’s
what Orbach asked for,” says Izak.
“If that would have happened I would have switched to Leon’s
camp," Izak added. "Canceling the draft law would have been like
Lieberman promising to bring the messiah. But Lieberman said that he was not
the Prime Minister and could not promise what was requested. So Orbach asked
him why he was sitting there and told him to bring the Prime Minister. Orbach
was our weak spot. We weren’t coordinated with him. We weren’t sure about him.”
The two consultants emphatically deny promising Epstein the
deputy mayor’s job in exchange for remaining in the race. “We’re honest people.
I told people that we were going to win and that we should work together”, says
Izak. “We couldn’t promise such a thing,” adds Kroizer. However, they hasten to
add that if Epstein does get the job it would not be unusual. “Barkat has an
interest in adding all the Orthodox factions to his coalition. They grew from
12 to 14 members on the council and he is negotiating with them”, says Kroizer.
The highlight of the campaign occurred earlier in the week,
in expectation of the Hassidic rabbis’ decision. A day before the election,
Kroizer signed a deal with all of the rabbis, leaving everyone a free choice.
On the day of elections Barkat had chalked up two achievements. The Hassidic
communities were still undecided and Epstein was still on the ballot.
Lieberman’s steamroller had failed this time.
Despite their success, the two aren’t convinced that Barkat
wouldn’t have won even without their help. “If all the ultra-Orthodox had been
united in supporting Leon, perhaps more secular voters would have turned out,
says Kroizer. "The Orthodox sector on its own is not enough to win
elections.
Even with all factions combined, they number only 95,000 voters. All the secular population would have come out to vote after the media reported the ‘danger’ to Jerusalem of an Orthodox takeover. The truth is that Barkat avoided an anti-Orthodox campaign, out of ideology and conviction, even though that would get out the secular vote. This helped him with the Orthodox sector. Our job was to get this message across."
Even with all factions combined, they number only 95,000 voters. All the secular population would have come out to vote after the media reported the ‘danger’ to Jerusalem of an Orthodox takeover. The truth is that Barkat avoided an anti-Orthodox campaign, out of ideology and conviction, even though that would get out the secular vote. This helped him with the Orthodox sector. Our job was to get this message across."
Asked whether the two were attempting to reduce the
criticism that they had betrayed the community and encouraged divisiveness,
Kroizer said, “We’re not important enough to be divisive.” Izak said that going
to Shteinman appeared to be taking sides. “The Orthodox candidate became a
candidate of one side, Degel Hatorah. Even Agudat Yisrael people didn’t like
the early attachment to the Lithuanians.”
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